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MR. JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK
C. B. DUTTON *
Tom C. Clark," most-recent-but-one of President Truman's appointees to
the Supreme Court,2 is an easy man about whom to generalize, but a difficult
one to study or predict in terms of specific issues. This was true at the time
of his appointment and it is true today, after he has spent more than a year
on the Court.'
Justice Clark came to the Supreme Court a well known political figure4
but without prior judicial experience 5 and with little written record of his
viewpoints except as evidenced by his frequent public speeches.6 He has not
been teacher or writer as have been several of his brethren and predecessors,
and the customary literature is therefore not available for the speculative
perusal of those who would predict his behavior as he is confronted with
more and more of the hotly contested legal issues of the day.7
It is therefore somewhat difficult to find a background against which to
review Justice Clark's first term. Moreover, the thirteen opinions which he
authored during the 1949 term fail to constitute an entirely satisfactory
medium through which to appraise the work and judicial philosophy of this
newcomer to our highest bench; for, by accident or design of a friendly Chief,"
* Member of the Indianapolis Bar; former Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law.
1. Who's Who, 1950 gives the Justice's name as "Thomas Campbell Clark." At
least one biographer asserts that "Tom" is Justice Clark's entire first name. Current
Biography 107 (1945). The latter appellation is used throughout the printed record of
Hearings Before Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the Nomination
of Torn C. Clark, of Texas, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) (hereinafter referred to as "confirmation hearings").
2. Justice Clark is the youngest man on the Court. He was born September 23, 1899.
The next youngest Justice is Douglas, 52. Justice Jackson is 58. The remaining Justices
are in their sixties, the oldest being Frankfurter, 68.
3. Justice Clark took the oath of office on August 24, 1949.
4. His career is uniformly regarded as "political," although it should be noted that
he has never sought or held federal elective office. See Moley, New Faces in the Cabinet,
Newsweek, June 4, 1945, p. 116.
5. Justice Clark for two years acted as Master in Chancery in Dallas County, Texas,
following his return to iirivate practice in 1932. ,Current Biography 107 (1945).
6. From the time of his appointment as Attorney General in 1945 to the present time,
Justice Clark has been an energetic public speaker. Most of his addresses have been on
non-controversial topics, but some, referred to subsequently herein, are believed to be
significant indices of the views and philosophy of the new Justice.
7. For an interesting study of Justice Frankfurter's legal philosophy as indicated
in his writings and work prior to appointment to the Supreme Court, see Hamilton,
Preview of a Jiustice, 48 YALE L. J. 819 (1939) ; see also Fuchs, Judicial Art of W. B.
Rutledge, 28 WASH. U. L. Q. 115 (1943).
8. It is generally conceded that Justice Clark owes most gratitude foi his appoint-
ment to Chief Justice Vinson. See Mr. Justice Clark, Wall Street Journal, July 30, 1949;
Drew Pearson, Indianapolis Star, Sept. 15, 1949; ALLEN & SHANNON, THE TRUMAN
MERRY-Go-RoUND 388 (1950).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
most of the cases assigned to Mr. Clark have been relatively uncontroversial
and probably should not have been before the Court in the first place.
In this paper, it is proposed, accordingly, to examine the Justice through
fieldglass rather than microscope. Instead of concentrating on his first term
opinions, which, for paucity, if for no other reason, cannot reveal much, the
inquiry will be whether there is enough record of any kind to permit one to
say with confidence where Justice Clark stands with respect to certain classifi-
cations of issues which are almost certain to be before him in terms to come,
and concerning which, sooner or later, he must speak.
The "evidence" available for examination consists of first term opinions,
speeches and few writings, and the hearsay of advocates and detractors of the
Justice. From such data we will observe what is displayed of his views on
such matters as the judicial function, federal and state rights, civil liberties, and
certain other illustrative fields. The objective is to note whether from such
a study emerges a clear portrait of a judge, pleasing or not, or merely a blurred
vision that can be brought into sharp focus only by passing time.
BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE
Tom Clark was born fifty-one years ago in Dallas, Texas, the son and
grandson of successful lawyers. He took his law degree at the University of
Texas and was admitted to the Texas bar in 1922. He entered private law
practice with his father and brother, engaged in local political activity, and
became a protege of two Texas political notables, Senator Tom Connally and
Representative Sam Rayburn.
He was aware of the political advantages of service in the district attor-
ney's office and devoted five years to such work-during which he is reputed
never to have lost a case. This early experience may have been the source of
one of his often quoted, personal axioms, "A good lawyer doesn't file a case
unless he's sure he'll win."9
Tom Clark returned to private practice in 1932, being associated with
William McCraw from 1933 to 1935, during part of which time McCraw was
Attorney General of Texas. Although he was financially successful in prac-
tice, Clark's sponsors urged him to go to Washington. He accepted an ap-
pointment to the Department of Justice under Attorney General Homer S.
Cummings in 1937. From that time on he moved upward through this de-
partment with amazing velocity. He was successively a special assistant to
the Attorney General in the Anti-trust Division, Chief of the West Coast of-
fices of the Anti-trust Division, Coordinator of Alien Property Control of the
Western Defense Comnand and Chief of the Civilian Staff for Japanese War
9. Clark: Cautious Trust Buster, Business Week, May 26, 1945, p. 5; The President's
New Lawyer, Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 29, 1945, p. 9.
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Relocation, Chief of the War Frauds Unit of the Anti-trust Division, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Anti-trust Division, Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Criminal Division, and Attorney General.
The Justice has never posed as an intellectual, a liberal, or a brilliant
lawyer. He has demonstrated considerable legal talent, however, and his
political astuteness and judgment are well recognized. He has the respect, and
is a close friend, of the president, dating from war frauds work in conjunction
with the so-called Truman Committee. Certainly he is a hard worker. As
head of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department he occupied what has
been described as the "hottest legal seat" in the country, and earned a reputa-
tion for calmness and balance. He argued some cases personally before the
Court on which he now sits and did a creditable job.10 Notwithstanding
considerable vociferous opposition from extreme "liberal" elements,1' and
mild opposition from some conservative groups, his appointment was
speedily confirmed. 2
FIRST TERM STATISTICS
Justice Clark wrote twelve majority opinions during his first term, and
added a special concurring opinion. This is good output for a new man on
a court where the maximum number of opinions produced by any Justice was
thirteen and several of his more experienced associates wrote far fewer.13 He
spoke for the Court in four tax cases,' 4 two Federal Employer's Liability
10. For more detailed biographical data, see: Current Biography 107 (1945) ; Who's
Who, 1950; The President's New Lawyer, Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 29, 1945, p. 9;
Lerner in Holiday, February 1950, p. 120; Confirmation Hearings 3; biographical data
on file with Librarian, U. S. Sup. Ct., dated April 25, 1949.
11. See Confirmation Hearings, testimony commencing at 32, 39, 72, 79, 85, 92, 100,
107, 126, 143, 166.
12. The vote of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was 9-2. Wall Street Journal
August 13, 1949. The nomination had been endorsed by labor and business, leaders,
former associates in the Department of Justice, four past presidents of the American
Bar Association, and innumerable judges and lawyers. See report of Confirmation
Hearings.
13. The number of opinions written for the Court by each Justice is as follows:
Black, Jackson 13
Clark, Minton 12
Vinson 10
Burton 9
Frankfurter 8
Reed 6
Douglas 4
The reason for the small number of opinions by Justice Douglas was, of course, his long
absence due to injuries. He did not participate in seventy-five cases in which opinions
were written. 18 .U.S.L. WEEK 3346 (June 20, 1950).
14. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949) ; Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell,
338 U.S. 411 (1949) ; New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, etc.
of N. J., 338 U.S. 665 (1950); Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950).
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Act-Federal Safety Appliance Act cases,' 5 two National Labor Relations Act
cases,' 8 a bankruptcy case involving responsibility of corporate directors and
their families or associates,' 7 a National Service Life Insurance case, 8 an
eminent domain valuation case,' 9 and a case involving the proper convening
and procedure of military general courts martial.20  His concurring opinion
was written- in a case involving discrimination against negroes in the selection
of grand juries.2'
The new Justice was expected to tip the Court's balance to the conserva-
tive side22 and the reader of his opinions senses that this expedtation has been
fulfilled. He was also believed destined to be a "swing man," 23 but this
prophesy has not been clearly sustained.
In the opinions which he wrote for the Court, Justice Clark spoke for a
clear majority exactly half of the time. In United States v. Toronto, Hamilton
&' Buffalo Navigation Co.,2 4 Hiatt, Warden v. Brown,25 and Wilmette Park
Dist. v. Campbell 26 there were no dissents.27 In Brown Shoe Co. v. C. I. R.,28
Treichler v. Wisconsin,29 and New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of
Tax Appeals, Etc. of New Jersey3 0 there was only one dissenting vote, that of
justice Black.2 ' Conceding that Justice Douglas, who did not participate in
the latter two cases would have voted with Justice Black, 2 it could be said that
Clark, together with the other newcomer, Minton, "swung" in these cases to
the conservative side of the Court led by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson.
Similarly in Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker,33 in which the Court divided
15. Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R.R., 338 U.S. 430 (1949); Affolder v.
N.Y.C. & St. L. R.R., 339 U.S. 96 (1950).
16. NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563 (1950); NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co.,
339 U.S. 557 (1950).
17. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949).
18. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
19. United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396
(1949).
20. Hiatt, Warden v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
21. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
22. U. S. News and World Report, August 5, 1949, pp. 20, 21.
23. Mr. Justice Clark, Wall Street Journal, July 30, 1949.
24. 338 U.S. 396 (1949).
25. 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
26. 338 U.S. 411 (1949).
27. The first two decisions were voted 8-0 and the last, 7-0.
28. 339 U.S. 583 (1950).
29. 338 U.S. 251 (1949).
30. 338 U.S. 665 (1950).
31. The votes, respectively, were 8-1, 7-1 and 7-1.
32. This is a safe concession in the Treichler case for in his dissent Justice Black
sounded his familiar theme that the 14th Amendment does not give the Supreme Court
the degree of control over state legislation that it asserts. Justice Douglas has indicated
general accord with this proposition. The concession is not so clear in the New Jersey
Realty Title Insurance Co. case.
33. 338 U.S. 304 (1949).
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six to two, if both Clark and Minton had sided with Black and Burton the
Court would have been evenly divided.
By the same reasoning it can be shown that in other cases Justice Clark
has swung to the liberal bloc. In two cases, Wissner v. Wissner 4 and Affolder
v. N.Y.C. & St. L. R.R.,35 in which the Court divided five to three, he may
have cast the vote that prevented the Court from impasse, and carried the day
against the Frankfurter-Jackson faction. Putting Justices Clark and Minton's
votes together in a third case, 36 it can be said they "swung" the decision from
a four to four deadlock to a six to two victory for the more liberal element
led by Justice Black.
The falsity of the impression created by such statistics is that it leaves
out the reasons why the Court voted as it did. For example, in four3 7 cases
where Clark, perhaps in conjunction with his fellow freshman, Minton, ap-
parently used his vote to tip the scales in favor of the Black group, the dissents
of the conservative minority were based not on substantive quarrels with the
views of the majority but merely on the proposition that the writs of certiorari
had been improvidently granted.
Of course there was at least one case wherein another member of the
Supreme Court himself impliedly suggested that the newcomers, Clark and
Minton, had changed the balance of the Court on an important civil liberties
issue, that of the validity of searches without warrant.38  But in this case the
so-called blocs were mixed, for, along with Justice Frankfurter, Justice Black
also dissented to the majority opinion written by Justice Minton,
The latter episode suggests the real reason why it is hard to say just where
Justice Clark falls in this liberal-conservative, swingman speculation. Such
terms premise strong and violent cleavages between definite factions on the
court, which, indeed, apparently have existed in recent terms. *The 1949-50
term showed a marked drop in cleavage in the court, however. Whereas
there were thirty-six five to four decisions in the 1948-49 term, there were
only two in the 1949-50 term. There were four, four to three decisions and
nine, five to three."9 This change may be accounted for in part by Justice
Douglas' absence for much of the term ;4o but counting all these cases as in
the category of the "sharply divided" court, the number is still less than
34. 338 U.S. 665 (1950).
35. 339 U.S. 96 (1950).
36. Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R.R., 338 U.S. 430 (1949).
37. See dissents of Justice Frankfurter in Affolder v. N.Y.C. & St. L. R.R., 339
U.S. 96, 101 (1950) and Carter v. Atlantic etc. R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 437 (1949) and of
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Jackson, in NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339
U.S. 563, 570 (1950) (applicable also to NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 577 (1950)).
38. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) ; Minton, Clark Target
of Frankfurter Blast, Indianapolis Star, February 22, 1950.
3. 18 U.S.L. WExx 3345 (June 20, 1950).
40. See note 13 supra.
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half that of the previous term. The number of dissenting votes cast decreased
from 272 in the previous term to 126 in the 1949-50 term, and the percentage
of opinions in which dissenting votes were noted fell off from 74 to 67.41
Also the composition of the dissenting groups has changed strikingly,
which interferes with classifying Justice Clark with any of the heretofore
familiarly opposed groups of Justices. Justices Black and Frankfurter often
saw eye-to-eye as even did Justices Black and Jackson.42 The truth seems to
be that the more rampant "liberals" on the court have mellowed somewhat and
the "conservatives" are not always that, nor nearly so staid as was suspected. 3
As one writer has expressed it, in prefacing his discussion of the pre-Clark
Court's views on civil libetties ". . . the degree of concord .. .is much more
important than the degree of discord, and the themes of discord are not . . .
symetrical." 44
The most important statistics concerning Justice Clark are these:
(1) He cast no dissenting vote whatsoever.41
(2) He has shown an almost unbelievable unanimity of opinion with
his Chief. 41
(3) He has been scrupulous about disqualification. 47
41. Justice Black noted the most dissents, 32. If Douglas would have noted the
same number had he been present the full term, the statistics would not be changed greatly.
42. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson still joined most frequently in dissents-nineteen
times. However, Justices Black and Frankfurter teamed up ten times and Justices Black
and Jackson were together in dissent six times. 18 U.S.L. WEEK 3346 (June 20, 1950).
43. Others have made this observation in less temperate mood and have expressed it
differently. See ALLEN & SHANNON, THE TRUMAN MERRY-GO-ROUND 354-361 (1950).
44. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 9 (1949):
45. See 18 U.S.L. WEEK 3346 (June 20, 1950). This may suggest that he is neither
swing man nor person of strong views of any kind, but merely will go along with majorities
otherwise determined. That Justice Clark has no strong views on economic issues, at
least, has been suggested. U.S. News & World Report, August 5, 1949, p. 20. This
pattern may be sharply changed in the 1950-51 term. Out of seven cases in which
opinions have been reported as of this writing, Justice Clark has noted two dissents and
has written opinions setting out his minority view. In Missouri v. Mayfield, 71
Sup. Ct. 1, 4 (1950) he was joined in dissent by Justices Vinson, Black and Douglas, and
in Snyder v. Buck, 71 Sup. Ct. 93, 102 (1950) he was joined by Justice Black. Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justice Jackson, also dissented.
46. Since Justice Clark noted no dissents and Chief Justice Vinson noted only two,
they were perforce together on all but two decisions. See 18 U.S.L. WEEK 3346 (June
20, 1950). One almost fantastic example of "follow the leader," if it does not result
from a misprint, is indicated by the report of Cohnstaedt v. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 339 U.S. 849 (1950). Justice Clark is shown as joining Chief Justice Vin-
son's dissent (without opinion) even though Justice Clark had theretofore elected to
disqualify himself. See same case, 338 U.S. 890 (1949).
47. As would be expected, in view of the large number of cases with which he was
concerned during his years in the Attorney General's office, Justice Clark has dis-
qualified himself in many cases for which there are only memorandum decisions. In
addition he disqualified himself in sixteen cases in which opinions were written. 18
U.S.L. WEEK 3346 (June 20, 1950).
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ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
Turning now to the evidence on the specific matters referred to earlier,
first, what is the viewpoint and philosophy of the new judge as to the raison
d'etre of the court on which he sits, and of the function of judges in general?
Justice Clark has written little on this subject, perhaps because his appoint-
ment came unexpectedly, perhaps because in the pell mell pace of his political
career he never formed a judicial philosophy or never took occasion to express
it. His first term writings have not served to fill in much of the gap.
Chief Justice Vinson, in a recent speech before the American Bar As-
sociation 48 has given us one of the best of modern statements of the purpose
and function of the Supreme Court: "The function of the Supreme Court
is, therefore, to resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have
arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide import under the
Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory
power over lower federal courts. If we took every case in which an interest-
ing legal question is raised, or our prima facie impression is that the decision
below is erroneous, we could not fulfill the Constitutional and statutory
responsibilities placed upon the Court. To remain effective, the Supreme
Court must continue to decide only those cases which present questions whose
resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the particular facts
and parties involved. Those of you whose petitions for certiorari are granted
by the Supreme Court will know, therefore, that you are, in a sense, prosecut-
ing or defending class actions; that you represent not only your clients, but
tremendously important principles, upon which are based the plans, hopes, and
aspirations of a great many people throughout the country."
In view of his close adherence to the views of his chief, one would expect
this also to be the approach of Justice Clark to questions involved in Supreme
Court review of lower court work. Perhaps it is, but the record here is
particularly cloudy. In two of his first term opinions he wrote for a majority
of the court in reversing a court of appeals which had theretofore, and there-
after, adhered to the established general rule that the National Labor Relations
Board is entitled to enforcement of its cease and desist orders, even long after.
their entry by the board, without further taking of evidence. 49 As was ef-
fectively pointed out in the dissenting opinion 50 here was no grave national
issue, no principle of importance to the multitudes. The Court of Appeals
simply had found exceptional circumstances justifying a slight deviation from
48. September 7, 1949. For full text see 70 Sup. Ct. 13 (1949).
49. NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563 (1950) and NLRB v. Pool Mfg.
Co., 339 U.S. 577 (1950).
50. 339 U.S. 563, 570 (1950).
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usual practice. It seems patent that the Supreme Court might have spent its
time and energies on matters of greater import.
Similarly, Justice Clark became himself too much involved in specific
trivia in writing for the court in United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo
Navigation Co.,5 involving an action to recover from the United States reason-
able compensation for a Great Lakes car ferry requisitioned by the War Ship-
ping Administration during World War II. The vessel involved had been built
in 1916, was obsolete for its original use, and had been idle from 1932 to 1935
and again from 1937 until taken over by the government in 1942. There was
no market for vessels of this type except perhaps for. salt water use in the
Florida area.
The Court of Claims had awarded claimant more than twice the amount
of the original determination of value basing its award on the capitalization
of earnings prior to 1932 less conversion cost, repairs, an allowance for
reduced life in salt water, and certain other expenses. The Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Claims, Mr. Clark writing an elaborate review of the
factors entering into a condemnation award under these unusual facts. The
actual decision of the court is undoubtedly sound, in that the Court of Claims,
in making its determination of fair compensation, took into account some
rather irrelevant factors.52 However, it is out of keeping with the Supreme
Court's function sharply to limit the lower courts' discretion in such matters
and literally to dictate the valuation method to be followed.53
On the other hand, Justice Clark has indicated an awareness of the prac-
tical necessity of limiting the subject matter of review by the procedure
adopted by a petitioner,5 4 no matter how tempting the particular case may be as
a stump from which to decry improper handling of important personal rights.
Although he has written for the Court in striking down state legislation
that would have been fairly easy to sustain,5 the Justice is not yet, at least,
disclosed as a judicial legislator. If anything, the available evidence indicates
his philosophy to point the other way: legislation means literally what it says;
if it is constitutional that is that; if it is not, make no effort to save it or
51. 338 U.S. 396 (1949).
52. For example, the vessel involved was obsolete, and had no current earnings'
record, so the court took into account earnings prior to 1932. 338 U.S. 396, 403-404 (1949).
53. See 23 TEMP. L. Q. 425 (1950). Justice Clark suggested, rather pointedly, see
338 U.S. 396, 403-404 (1950), that the insurance valuation of the ship was highly sig-
nificant. Notwithstanding the potential errors and injustice inherent in such method
of valuation, the lower court apparently felt obliged to follow the suggestion. See 18
U.S.L. WEEK 2409 (March 14, 1950).
54. See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 109-111 (1950).
55. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949) ; New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v.
Division of Tax Appeals, etc. of N. J., 338 U. S. 665 (1950).
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improve it by interpretation. 6 This point of view was dearly a part of the
federal authorities case in the Tidelands litigation which Clark spearheaded
as Attorney General.57  The government urged its position upon the Court
notwithstanding clear evidence that great dislocations of control and ad-
ministration would attend its acceptance,5" contending that subsequent legisla-
tion would correct the inequities created.5
The Justice has indicated his belief that legislation and administrative
action have supplanted judicial decision as the principal sources of the laws'
growth and that he has no quarrel with this trend.60  This does not mean,
however, that judges should forfeit their responsibility to recommend and
work for judicial improvement. He sees the most chance for improvement
in our judiciary through better administrative organization6 and the appoint-
ment to judgeship of lawyers with solid trial experience.62
FEDERAL v. STATE RIGHTS
Although he has declared himself to the contrary63 Tom Clark is a
federalist.' This may be somewhat surprising in a Texan, but it is the clear
result of an energetic and successful career in federal position holding. When
the chips are down as between state law and federal, Justice Clark sides with
the government that has made him what he is.
This shows up rather clearly in his several first term opinions wherein
the states fared badly. He did not try at all to uphold the Wisconsin Emerg-
ency Tax on Inheritances,6" even though his opinion, if not expressly, by
necessary implication invalidates the state's normal and estate tax and casts
56. Cf. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950). As to whether this is good judicial
technique, see FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 38-40 (1949).
57. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
58. Interestingly enough, the federal legislation which was assumed to be applicable
to permit regulation of the tidelands area held by the Court to be United States property,
was ruled inapplicable by Mr. Clark as Attorney General. See 27 CONG. DIGEST 241
(1948).
59. This argument met vociferous resistance from some members of the Court. See
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 45 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
60. See Speech, Legislative Responsibility for JTudicial Reorganization, prepared for
delivery before the American Bar Association on September 19, 1950, printed in CONG.
REc. A7192 (Sept. 22, 1950).
61. See Speech, CONG. REc. supra note 60, at A7193.
62. See speech before Bar Association of Tennessee printed in 19 TENN. L. REV. 150
(1946).
63. In a speech before the State Bar of Michigan, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Septem-
ber 18, 1947, he said, "I am a great believer in states' rights. The best government is
that closest to the people.' Portions of the speech including the quotation are printed in
Highlights from Addresses by Toin C. Clark, Attorney General of the United States,
privately printed. Mr. Clark also has argued that the best protection for civil rights is
effective and proper law enforcement at local levels. Clark, How Much do you Value
your Freedom?, American Magazine, Dec., 1946, p. 32.
64. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
doubt on the validity of many similar state laws.6" He expressed little concern
over the felt necessity to invalidate the New Jersey intangible property tax in
view of the slight possibility that it might affect the marketability of federal
government tax exempt securities.60 Conversely, he worked very hard indeed
to render holeproof his opinion that the federal government may tax admis-
sions to a municipally owned, non-profit bathing beach.
67
The most striking revelation of Clark's federal supremacy leanings is
found, however, in the National Service Life Insurance decision of Wissner v.
Wissner,68 a case involving a California widow's action against her deceased
husband's parents for one-half the proceeds of his national service life insur-
ance policy. The widow's suit was based on the theory that since the policy
was purchased out of her husband's army pay, one half of which was hers as
California community property, one half of the proceeds of the policy belonged
to her and was beyond his power to give away by naming his parents as
beneficiaries.
Notwithstanding the Court's earlier recognition of the necessary effects
upon federal law of the systems of property ownership existing in the so-called
community property states, 9 and its history of enormous concern for the
welfare of wives, divorced or otherwise, °7 Justice Clark found the congres-
sional intent to protect the "soldier's choice" of beneficiary so compelling as
to negative an entire line of cases recognizing a state's power to define the
property rights of its domiciliaries.7 1  He places his decision on what he finds
as congressional intent 2 but one cannot find such intent without first having
the end in view. The opinion is a clear case of voting that federal control
shall be unaffected by theoretically conflicting state law.7 3
65. See 34 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1950),
66. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, etc., of N. J.,
338 U.S. 665 (1950). See Comment, 19 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 339 (1950).
67. Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949). The decision was, of
course, foreshadowed by previous decisions, and the result is not questioned. Cf. Helver-
ing v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938) ; New York
v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
68. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
69. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) ; Commissioner v. Harmon 323 U.S.
44 (1944).
70. Cf. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S.
562 (1906) ; Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1913) ; Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948).
71. See cases cited in note 69 supra; United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931);
cf. Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; See Note 11 A.L.R. 123 (1921).
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Minton, is little more satisfying in its recog-
nition of the real issues in the case. See 338 U.S. 655, 661 (1949).
72. See 338 U.S. 655, 658-660 (1949).
73. The opinion may also reflect a "good man's" view that a mother is, of course, to
be preferred over an estranged but undivorced wife, who since her husband was a soldier,
was doubtlessly at fault. "Pursuant to the congressional command, the Government con-
tracted to pay the insurance to the insured's choice. He chose his mother. It is plain
JUSTICE CLARK
This feeling that the federal government, and Congress, shall have what
it wants, is not new to Justice Clark. One could understand his official ad-
vocacy of the federal government's claim to ownership of the California con-
tinental shelf, as he was Attorney General at the time and as such supervised
the litigation.7 4  His advocacy did not stop there, however. He carried his
defense of the government's position into the law reviews 5 and before Con-
gressional committees.71 It is interesting to note that he stated he did not
consider this question to be one of federal vs. state supremacy, even if almost
all other interested persons so recognized it. The supporters of the bills to
revest title to the tidelands in the states were the officials of the 46 states,
whereas the opposition came from federal officials, the National Grange, and
applicants for federal licenses to exploit the underwater land.7 7
In the field of civil rights Justice Clark believes that the federal govern-
ment should have power to move into local law enforcement levels when the
states fail to give the protection needed, further evidence that in his opinion
the national government can do successfully what the states fail to accomplish.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
It is in this area that most of the pre-confirmation criticism of Justice
Clark occurred. He was denounced as anti-negro, 79 anti-labor, 0 the oppressor
of unpopular political faiths," a non-respecter of free speech,8 2 the author
of guilt by association 83 -in short as an enemy of the cause of civil rights.8 4
A look at the record here is most revealing, if not entirely conclusive.
Justice Clark is not anti-negro. He voted with the majority in quashing
a criminal indictment because negroes were discriminated against in selecting
to us that the judgment of the lower court, as to one-half of the proceeds, substitutes the
widow for the mother, who was the beneficiary Congress directed shall receive the in-
surance money." 338 U.S. 655, 658-660 (1949).
74.. United States v. California, 322 U.S. 19 (1947).
75. Clark, National Sovereignty and Dominion over Lands Underlying the Ocean,
27 TEx. L. REv. 140 (1948). This article shows ability in the arena of written advocacy.
The skill displayed seems to outweigh the sheer weight of scholarship evidenced in an
opposing article, Hardwicke, Illig, and Patterson, The Constitution and the Continental
Shelf, 26 TEx. L. REv. 398 (1948).
76. See Testimony on Tidelands Bill (Con) 27 CONG. DIGEST 247 (1948).
77. 27 CoNG. DIGEST 229ff (1948).
78. Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks -at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 COL. L. REv.
175 (1947).
79. Confirmation hearings 55, 87, 93, 104, 113, 115.
80. Confirmation hearings 36, "4", 47, 79, 88, 166.
81. Confirmation hearings 32, 55, 65, 85, 103, 126, 177.
82.. Confirmation hearings 54, 73, 103, 108.
83. Confirmation hearings 39-45, 48, 74, 131, 144; Ickes, Hysteria in the Justice Dept.,
New Republic, July 4, 1949, p. 14.
84. Confirmation hearings 56, 76-77, 86, 102.
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grand jury panels,"' and in outlawing color segregation in schools.8 6 He
disqualified himself in the dining car case.s 7 As president of the Federal
Bar Association, he demanded admission of negro lawyers. 8
As to labor, it is true he managed the successful campaign to enjoin a
labor union from perpetuating a national emergency." This was, however, a
special situation and was more the result of his job as Attorney General than
evidence of deep rooted animosity to labor.. His first term opinions support-
ing the National Labor Relations Board"0 and favoring injured workmen9 ' do
not evidence antagonism to labor's cause.
Justice Clark, as Attorney General, has been extremely outspoken against
communism and what he conceives to be subversivism ;92 and it is not denied
that he compiled the first list of so-called subversive organizations, which in
some cases has resulted in injustice and persecution. Certainly the manner of
conducting the so-called loyalty board investigations in denial of the traditional
safeguards of confrontation by one's accuser and cross-examination is shock-
ing and out of keeping with the American system. To the extent of his
responsibility for the system, he is open to censure; but the extent of his
responsibility or participation is not established.",
Although Civil Liberties groups worried over the treatment of Japanese
in the wartime relocation program, the indications are that Mr. Clark handled
the program with humanity and consideration. 94 If there is not yet any real
evidence that Justice Clark has a penetrating understanding of the subtleties
of the civil liberties problem,9" at least he is aware of the existence of the
85. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 296 (1950) (Justice Clark filed a special con-
curring opinion.)
86. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950).
87. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
88. Current Biography 107 (1945).
89. The litigation ended in the decision of United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258 (1947).
90. NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563 (1950); NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co.,
339 U.S. 258 (1947).
91. Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 430 (1949) ; Af folder v.
N.Y.C. & St. L. R. Co., 339 U.S. 96 (1950).
92. See for example, Justice: Fighting Red Hot, Newsweek, July 8, 1946, p. 22.
93. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary found that Mr. Clark was not the author
of the program. See Confirmation Hearings 75. The attack on Mr. Clark is therefore
for his inaction in not inserting, or insisting upon, proper constitutional safeguards. There
have been relatively few loyalty cases, if that is any justification. See REP. ATT'y GEN.
11 (1947).
94. Moley, New Faces in the Cabinet, Newsweek, June 4, 1945, p. 116; Current
Biography 107 (1945).
95. For an excellent discussion of civil liberties in the Supreme Court, and the many
variations in thinking and result, see FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT
9-36 (1949). Justice Clark's concurrence with the majority of the Court in approving
the extended search without warrant under attack in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950), for which he and Justice Minton were excoriated by Justice Frankfurter, is an
JUSTICE CLARK
problem, and has warned against the upsurge in intolerance in a manner that
indicates he will not lightly give approval to prescriptions of free speech:
"Even the enemies of liberty and tolerance-our noisy pro-Fascists and race
bigots-must be allowed free speech (but not freedom to intimidate). Granted
that they would suppress our liberties if they could, that is no excuse for us
to beat them to the punch by suppressing theirs first."90  He has indorsed
at least one project of the civil liberties groups, that of a federal civil
liberties statute.
7
In sum it is likely that Justice Clark's future activity on the Court will
not substantiate the charges that the civil liberties campaigners have had an
opponent thrust upon them. The guess is ventured that, in time, the Justice's
record will indicate that the only proper lament of those who worry most
vocally about loss of our civil liberties because of his appointment is merely
that they failed to obtain a scale model replacement for their champion,
former Justice Murphy.
THE COMMERCE POWER
Justice Clark has not yet written his views as to the lengths Congress may
go in regulating business under its power over interstate commerce.9 8 None
of his first term votes were cast to restrict the power of Congress, however,
and he voted on several occasions to extend federal control into new fields or
to broaden its application. 9 This is, of course, in keeping with his profederal
government inclination, noted earlier herein, and he can be expected to
continue in this pattern.
BusINEss LAW
Several of his first term writings indicate that the Justice may come into
his own in dealing with the problems of American business. His opinion in
example of failure to support the passive rights of freedom -which Professor Freund
notes is fairly common on the Court. See FREuND, supra, at 22-24.
96. Clark, How Much Do Yon Value Your Freedom, American Magazine, Dec. 1946,
p. 32. See also Clark, Civil Rights: The Boundless Responsibility of Lawyers, 32
A.B.A.J. 453 (1946).
97. Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV.
175 (1947).
98. U.S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8, Ch. 3.
99. He voted with the majority in subjecting an intrastate gas company to jurisdic-
tion under the Natural Gas Act, Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338
U.S. 464 (1950); in classifying munitions production as commerce under the FLSA,
Powell v. United States, 339 U.S. 497 (1950) ; in striking down the Michigan Labor Medi-
ation Law as in conflict with the LMRA and federal power over commerce, International
Union, etc. v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) ; and in sustaining the non-communist affida-
vit requirement of the LHRA, American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 (1950). It is somewhat surprising, on the other hand, to find Justice Clark voting
with the majority to permit state taxation of interstate carriers. Capitol Greyhound
Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
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Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker'0 0 is a nicely balanced analysis of the deli-
cate problem of the responsibilities of and requisite good faith owed bydirectors to their corporation.' 0 ' He refused to respond to the urgings of
petitioner and the Securities and Exchange Commissionl °' to hold directors
accountable as trustees in purchasing at discount the obligations of their tech-
nically insolvent company which was nevertheless still a going concern.10 3 In
doing so he reached an eminently practical result without breaking down the
requirements -of loyalty and fair dealing to which directors necessarily must
answer. Although he did not express it, Justice Clark undoubtedly sensed, as
any business man would, that there are circumstances when it is desirable for
directors to be allowed to buy their ailing corporation's liabilities at a discount,
thereby relieving it of pressure from creditors and giving it a chance to
recover its financial footing. 04
In reversing a decision denying depreciation deductions for donated assets
and inclusion of contributions in a corporation's equity capital,' 5 Justice Clark
recognized the business necessity of taking depreciation on assets that wear
out and must be replaced, notwithstanding the absence of original cost to the
taxpayer. The practical business problem involved had escaped the tax-minded
Commissioner and Court of Appeals who could not see the difference between
actual contributions to corporate assets and the payment for connecting utility
lines by rural electricity buyers. 0 6
Also, although he became involved in detail unbecoming to a Supreme
Court Justice in defining proper valuation technique in a ship condemnation
case0 7 Justice Clark showed very real ability in recognizing and dealing with
100. 338 U.S. 304 (1949).
101. The Court treated the case in its most unfavorable light to respondents, in
discussing it from the standpoint of a director's duty of good faith. Respondents were
the wife and mother of a director, and his office associate.
102. Amicus curiae.
103. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the trust fund theory as to assets
of an insolvent corporation. Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371 (1893) ;
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
Justice Burton, joined by Justice Black, dissented to Justice Clark's opinidn and urged
application of the strict trust theory as did Judge Hand, dissenting to the Court of Appeals
decision, 173 F.2d 944, 951 (2d Cir. 1949).
104. Patently, there is great risk in purchasing such obligations. To attract buyers,
therefore, even among the directors, the prospect of more than usual profit is necessary.
The dissent assumes that such purchases create a conflict of interest, on the further
assumption that the directors will be over-anxious to liquidate their claims. Query, isn't
it the more reasonable assumption that ownership of obligations purchased at a discount
encourages directors to work to save the company, thereby permitting the larger profit
involved in repayment at face value? Most of the reviewers approved the decision. See
48 MicH. L. REv. 1194 (1950) 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 392- (1950); 62 HARV. L. REv. 1191
(1949). Contra, 25 IND. L. J. 208 (1950).
105. Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950).
106. Cf. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
107. United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396
(1949).
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practical business considerations in fixing forced-sale prices. Similar ability
to take hold of an unfamiliar and technical subject and handle it practically
and sensibly is demonstrated in his article on governmental liability for
wartime use of patented inventions. 08
ANTITRUST
It may be some time before former Attorney General Clark can set forth
judicially his views on the antitrust laws. He has been associated in one
capacity or another with most government suits since 1938 and it will be years
before- suits initiated after he left the Attorney General's Office come before
the Supreme Court. In the meantime court protocol requires him to dis-
qualify himself in these cases.0 9 He need not, of course, disqualify himself
in private treble damage suits which are unrelated to former government suits.
The Justice's views on monopoly are fairly easily discovered, and may
be interesting to note. As head of the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice and as Attorney General, he was conservative by comparison with
some of his militant predecessors. He filed a relatively small number of
prosecutions, but achieved a high rate of convictions."" He has a healthy
respect for the great contributions to our society which have been made by
American business,"' but believes that the monopoly laws are necessary and
desirable equipment for keeping productive genius unfettered. To Tom Clark
"The Sherman Act is but the traffic law of business.""'
He has demonstrated a willingness to work with business men in develop-
ing an effective administration of the antitrust statutes," 3 and is impressed
with the need of small business for protection." 4 Among other matters, he
is credited with practical and effective handling of the extremely complex and
troublesome motion picture industry litigation,:"5 and with putting an end
to lumber price fixing on the West Coast."'
108. Clark, Government Responsibility for Use of Patented Inventions, 20 TEmP. L. Q.
1 (1946).
109. See Mr. Justice Clark, Wall Street Journal, July 30, 1949; U.S. News & World
Report, Aug. 5, 1949, p. 20. Justice Clark's scrupulous record on disqualification already
has been noted.
110. See Clark, Cautious Trust Buster, Business Week May 26, 1945, p. 5. The bio-
graphical data furnished by the Librarian of the U. S. Supreme Court indicates that of 414
cases presented to the Court by the Attorney General's Office during Clark's term of
office, the government prevailed in 314, lost in 100.
111. REP. ATr'Y GEN. 7 (1947).
112. Speech before Nebraska State Bar Association, printed in 25 NEB. L. REV. 79
(1945).
113. See speeches before Bar Associations of Tennessee and Nebraska printed,
respectively, in 19 TENN. L. REv. 150 (1946) and 25 NEB. L. REv. 79 (1945).
114. While Attorney General, Mr. Clark re-established the Small Business Unit of the
Antitrust Division. REP. ATr'Y GEN. 8 (1947).
115. Moley, New Faces in the Cabinet, Newsweek, June 4, 1945, p. 116
116. Current Biography 107 (1945).
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Justice Clark, in other words, believes that the federal government can
preserve and restore competition through proper use of the antitrust laws.
He believes in strict but fair enforcement, based on proper investigation and
sound knowledge of the facts involved. 117 He does not believe in attacks on
long established, publicly known practices that have been approved by attor-
neys acting in good faith."" When violations of the laws are found, he
considers the most effective remedy to be that of divestiture."'
CRIMINAL LAW
Justice Clark's success as a criminal prosecutor already has been com-
mented upon. He has not been content merely to prosecute, however, but has
given much time to developing public awareness of the problems of enforcing
our criminal sanctions, and to the rehabilitation of criminals. 2 He has been
particularly concerned with the problem of juvenile delinquency.1 2'
CONCLUSION
What has been said above is as far as one can go, with any degree of
objectivity, in examining Justice Clark "on the record," for the present. It
must be conceded that his judicial portrait is not yet very clear.
One is somewhat inclined, therefore, to sum up the Justice in negatives-
no strong liberal convictions, no anachronistic conservatism, no deep-seated
philosophy or idealism, no impracticable theories, no impressive scholarship,
no flaming prose, no trenchant wit, etc.-thereby leaving a very large question
of whether, with so much ruled out, there is enough left to permit the people
to feel they have been given the kind of man they have a right to expect on
our highest court.
On the other hand, it should be true that even a Supreme Court
Justice is entitled to his .chance to prove himself. The review attempted
in this paper indicates that there is much evidence that Tom Clark may
prove to be a good working judge, even if, thus far, he has cast no per-
ceptible foreshadow of greatness or immortality.
117. He has advocated the making of investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation rather than by the lawyers of the antitrust division. See speech before Bar
Association of Tennessee, printed in 19 TENN. L. REV. 150 (1946).
118. Speech cited note 116 supra.
119. See REP. ATT'Y GEN. 8 (1947). Justice Clark was the author of the plan for
the disposal of the Alcoa aluminum plants. Current Biography 107 (1945).
120. See Clark, Foreword to Symposium on Fitting the Punishment to the Crizinal,
31 IoWA L. RaV. 191 (1945) ; Address before University of Texas Institute on Corpora-
tion Law, p. 8 (1950) (text available through Librarian, U. S. Sup. Ct.).
121. See speech before Bar Association of Tennessee, printed in 19 TENN. L. Rav. 150
(1946) ; Address before National Conference on Catholic Youth Work, May 21, 1947(available through Librarian, U.S. Sup. Ct.). In his reorganization plan for the Attorney
General's Office, Mr. Clark included the opening of a Bureau of Juvenile Delinquency.
MODERNIZING INDIANA'S CONSTITUTION
Louis E. LAMBERT* AND E. B. MCPHERONt
The ancient Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, insisted that nothing is perma-
nent except change. The maxim is readily applicable to government. For if
governmental institutions, including constitutions, are not revitalized and
adapted to meet changed social conditions, they will die as surely as did
the dinosaurs.
Birthdays are traditional times for weighing successes and failures and
for planning for the future. The people of Indiana might well begin such
weighing and planning now, for on November 1, 1951, their state constitution
will have been in effect 100 years. It is the thesis of this article that a revision
and adaptation of the constitution is in order.
A brief glance at the Indiana of 1850 sharpens the contrast with the
present. The 1850 population was slightly less than a million; .the 1950
population was almost 4 million.' The agricultural society of the 1850
Hoosiers had become primarily urban-industrial by 1950. A constitution
drawn to provide a suitable government for the society of our forebearers
would not likely meet the needs of a greatly changed era.
Of the forty-nine constitutions in the United States, only nine are older
than Indiana's. Eight of them, state constitutions, have been modernized-,
some quite extensively-since the Indiana Constitution was ratified.2 In fact,
many state constitutions have been recently revised: three have been adopted
in the last five years and in 1947 sixteen states were in various stages of con-
* Assistant Professor of Government, Indiana University.
I Director, Bureau of Government Research, Indiana University.
1. The contrast, however, is reflected more clearly by the following county popula-
tions :
County 185o T950
Allen 16,919 182,903
Lake 3,991 366,113
Marion 24,103 549,047
St. Joseph 10,954 204,740
Vanderburg 11,414 158,363
All population figures for 1850 were taken from the SEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES: the 1950 figures are preliminary census figures from the Bureau of the Census.
2. The New Hampshire constitution of 1874 had revisions in 1876, 1889, 1902, and
1912. Vermont had a revision of its 1793 constitution in 1869, and Ohio, through the
adoption of a number of amendments in 1912, actually revised its constitution. The 1870
Massachusetts constitution, though not revised since 1821, has been amended seventy-nine
times; Maine's 1820 constitution has been amended sixty-four times, while California
takes "first prize" with the amazing total of 312 amendments. The Wisconsin 1848
constitution, though only three years older than Indiana's, has been amended fifty-one
times. CouNCIrL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF STATES 1950-1951, 88-94. Also see
volumes I-VIII of the same work for the year 1941-1942.
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stitutional reform.- Of the state constitutions, Indiana's, with its fifteen
amendments, appears to be the oldest, basically, in existence.
The federal constitution is older, but its framers drew a generally worded
document. Unlike the Indiana Constitution it does not provide for many elected
officials, and its terms are susceptible of a wide latitude of interpretations.
In Indiana there has been some agitation for reform. The Indiana Muni-
cipal League has been vehement, if vague, for "home rule." The Indiana
State Teachers Association with simple clarity has called for a State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction to be appointed for a term longer than the con-
stitution now permits. Other groups have urged that the Superintendent's
office be taken out of politics, i.e., filled by appointment. Many citizens are
dissatisfied with the biennial legislative session that is constitutionally (but
not actually) limited to sixty-one days. The failure of the legislature for the
past twenty-eight years to carry out its constitutional duty of re-districting
the state foi- the apportionment of legislative representatives has been the
cause of frequent unfavorable comment. Recently Governor Henry F.
Schricker announced that he favored modernization of the Indiana Constitu-
tion. In an editorial comment on the speech, the Indianapolis Star said, "For
decades it has been clear that revisions of basic law could cure many ills of
Indiana Government and equip the state to meet modern conditions." Again,
when addressing the 1951 General Assembly, Governor Schricker called for
the "creation of a competent non-partisan committee" to study Indiana's state
and local government. .Interest in constitutional modernization is widespread;
and the need to revise the constitution is pressing.
In constitutional revisions in other states reform has centered on the
following problems:
1. Amending provisions, which in some states make it virtually
impossible to change the fundamental law.
2. Severe strictures on the legislature as to composition, length
of sessions, procedures and powers.
3. Disintegrated and irresponsible state executive and adminis-
trative organizations.
4. Court systems condemned for being administratively inefficient
and politically partisan.
5. Detailed limitations upon local government which prohibit or
hinder the development of home rule and at the same time saddle
the voter with the long ballot.
6. Miscellaneous subjects which vary in importance from state to
state but which include financial clauses, additions to Bills of Rights
and Merit provisions.
3. New Jersey, Georgia, and Missouri have recently revised their constitutions. New
York made some notable changes in 1938. The following states have recently taken
formal or legal action toward constitutional revision: California, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and
Oklahoma.
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In these areas, we shall point out some of Indiana's constitutional weak-
nesses, consider the problems connected with change, and offer some sugges-
tions.
THE AMENDING PROCESS
The amending provision of a constitution is the doorway to change. .To
be effective the amending procedures must be definite and not too restrictive.
In some states the door is virtually closed while in others it seems constantly
ajar. For example, Tennessee has had no amendments whatever to its 1870
constitution while California has had 312.
To prop6se amendments, fourteen states, including Indiana, require the
action of two successive legislatures. Some require a majority, others two-
thirds approval by the members of each house for the two consecutive sessions.*
The most liberal state, California, permits proposals by two-thirds of the
members of one session of the legislature, by initiative, or by convention.4
Popular ratification is necessary in most states.
A number of states, including Indiana, have no express provision for
calling a constitutional convention, but some are mandated to call conventions
at periods ranging from seven to twenty years.
Indiana conservatism towards constitutional change was evident in the
1816 constitution as well as in the present document. While the existing
charter provides for change only by amendment, the constitutional fathers of
1816 relied solely on the mandatory convention method. A brief summary of
efforts'to change each constitution will show that considerable confusion and
difficulty resulted from both methods.
The 1816 constitution stated: "Every twelfth year . . . there shall be
a poll opened in which the qualified electors of the State slball express by vote,
whether they are in favor of calling a convention or not. . . . "' Its ambiguity
indicates that some of the framers had considered this provision a defect. Did
it mean that only at twelve-year periods a convention could be called, or did it
permit more frequent polls? As a matter of fact, the question was submitted
in 1823, '28, '39, '46, and '49. Unsuccessful attempts were made to call a
convention fifteen other times between 1820 and 1847.
In 1846 a majority of those voting on the question favored calling a con-
vention, but less than a majority of the total votes cast were favorable. Was
this a proper majority? The constitution provided for the election of delegates
"if there should be a majority of all the votes given at such election in favor of
4. CAUF. CoNsT. ART. XVIII, § 2, ART. V, § 1.
5. IND. CONST. ART. VII, § 1 (1816).
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a convention." The debates were spectacular but no conclusion was reached.'
The election of 1849 resolved the question in favor of a convention.7
The Constitution of 1851 went into effect November 1st of that year, and
for about three decades the question of interpretation of the amending clause
did not arise. The first amendment, disclaiming state liability for indebted-
ness of the Wabash and Erie Canal, was ratified at a special election with but
little opposition in 1873. However, a group of amendments was voted upon
in 1880, and received a majority of votes cast on the amendments but failed
to receive a majority of those voting in the election. The Indiana Supreme
Court in State v. Swift declared that ratification by a "majority of said
electors" meant a majority of those voting in the election and not a majority of
those voting on the amendments." The court, while willing to accept the
proposition that "silence gives consent" when applied to those qualified voters
who did not choose to participate in the election, was not willing to grant the
proposition as to those who cast ballots in the election but chose to ignore the
amending proposals.' Thus the problem of securing ratification of an amend-
ment became so difficult that no further amendment was adopted until the
woman suffrage clause in 1921.10
Dissatisfaction with the amending process led to attempts at circumven-
tion. In 1911, the General Assembly submitted a proposed new constitution,
created by legislative act, to the people for ratification. This procedure was
held unconstitutional. 1 The court said that if the act of 1911 be considered
6. I & II KETTLEBOROUGH, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA (1916).
7. The reasons which lay back of the success of 1849 were cumulative, in part peculiar
to Indiana and in part shared with the nation. Nationally, there were generally depressed
conditions in the '40's, and the spirit of Jacksonian democracy expressed itself on the
questions of internal improvements, state banks, limitations on government, particularly
as to enactment of special legislation and creation of indebtedness. Perhaps most im-
portantly, the "wave on constitutional change brought the long ballot and short terms of
office.
8. State v. Swift, 69 Ind. 505 (1880).
9. The 1880 proposals were resubmitted at a special election in 1881 and were
adopted. They were:
ART. II, § 2 (Extending suffrage)
ART. II, § 5 (Restriction upon negro suffrage repealed)
ART. II, § 14 (Changing time of general election)
ART. IV, § 4 (Enumeration of males over 21)
ART. IV, § 22 (Grading pay of local officers)
ART. VII, § 1 (Power to create additional courts)
ART. XIII, § 1 (2% debt limitation)
10. At the general election of November, 1900, two amendments were submitted, but
neither received a majority of the votes cast at the election. The Indiana Supreme Court
decided in In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59 N.E. 359 (1900), that the amendments had neither
been adopted nor rejected, and were therefore still pending and obstructed further amend-
ment. In re Boswell, 179 Ind. 292, 100 N.E. 833 (1912), modified this decision to state
that an amendment which had been voted on and failed to receive a majority of the votes
cast in the election was rejected and the way was clear for future amendment.
11. Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912).
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the draft of a new constitution such an act was beyond the power of the
General Assembly which has only the "power to make, alter, and repeal laws";
and that if the act was merely a series of amendments it violated the procedure
established by the constitution for amendment.'
2
The 1917 General Assembly called a constitutional convention by virtue
of a law enacted during that session without first submitting the question to
the people. The court held this act unconstitutional in Bennett v. Jackson on
the grounds that the question had not been presented to the people for approval
or disapproval since 1914, when a previous proposal for a convention had
been defeated.' 8
The Bennett decision however did acknowledge the validity of the con-
vention as a means of changing the Indiana Constitution. Though the con-
vention method is not mentioned in Article 16, the court relied on Section 1 of
the Bill of Rights which states that ". . . the People have, at all times, an
indefeasible right to alter and reform their government." The court further
declared that "the people's power over constitutional amendments is supreme,
subject, however, to the condition that no new form of Constitution can be
established without some action . . .of the representatives of the old . . .'14
A major change in interpretation of the amending article resulted from
In re Todd in 1935."5 This decision overruled State v. Swift and interpreted
the phrase "majority of* the electors" to mean a majority of those voting on
a proposed amendment and not a majority of those voting in the election. The
ruling simplified the problem of securing amendments but the question still
existed as to what effect the decision had on three prior amendments which,
though failing, had received a majority of votes cast on the amendment. Fi-
nally Swank v. Tyndall" held that In re Todd was not retroactive in effect. 7
In 1947, a bill was introduced in the Senate to submit a proposal to the
people for the calling of a convention but failed to pass.
12. The bulk of the Marshall Constitution was submitted to the General Assembly
as amendments in 1913 and defeated in the 1915 session.
13. Bennett v. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, 116 N.E. 921 (1917).
14. Id. at 539, 116 N.E. at 923. The most recent referendum on the calling of a
constitutional convention was held at the general election of 1930. It was defeated
439,000 to 355,000. YEARBOOK OF INDIANA 46 (1930).
15. 208 Ind. 168, 193 N.E. 865 (1935).
16. 226 Ind. 204, 78 N.E.2d 535 (1948).
17. Thus, three important provisions which were generally accepted as parts of the
state constitution for some thirteen years are now deleted. The original provisions of
ART. XV, § 2, are restored and the significant phrase ". . . nor shall the term of office
or salary of any officer fixed by this Constitution or by law be increased during ,the term
for which such officer was elected or appointed" is not in effect. ART. VII, § 2 and ART.
X, § 8 are void.
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An appraisal- of the amending process in Indiana dearly indicates that a
change in our fundamental law is not easily come by."' While some state
constitutions have fewer amendments, the Indiana document would seem to
belong to a group of seven or eight which are least amenable to change. 9 In
Indiana, 453 bills proposing amendments to the 1851 constitution had beien
introduced through 1949 with 15 being ratified. It is unfortunate, however,
that so vital a part of the constitution should be the source of so much
uncertainty and confusion. There seems to be agreement that something
should be done to clarify the Article on Amendments.
The least that might be done would be to rewrite the article so as to
clearly state the requirement that ratification must have the approval of a
majority vote on the question and to expressly state the procedure for calling
a convention. However, Indiana might well go further and adopt a better
amending clause. One of the three states with the newest constitutions,
Missouri, provides that amendments may be proposed either by a majority
of all members in one session of the legislature or by an initiative petition
signed by eight per cent of the legal voters in at least two-thirds of the con-
gressional districts. Ratification of any proposal requires a majority of the
votes cast on the amendment. Also, the question of calling a convention
must be submitted to the voters of Missouri every twenty years; majority
approval on the question is required in order to call a convention.2"
LEGISLATIVE REVISION
As the most democratic element in our government, legislatures must
perform their jobs adequately or our democratic system, to some degree, fails.
In this section, we will concern ourselves primarily with what we consider the
chief problems of the legislature in Indiana: the length and frequency of
session, reapportionment and redistricting. No consideration is given to
unicameralism, though the single-chambered legislature of Nebraska seems to
have lived up to the glowing promises made for it.2 No attention is given to
the powers of the legislature or the constitutional restrictions placed upon
18. Four amendments, ratified in 1940, and the Sheriff's amendment, ratified in 1948,
complete the list of amendments to date. Three proposals awaiting action by the
General Assembly will probably be successful since they are as non-controversial as the
last five amendments adopted.
19. Compared to the United States Constitution, however, the amending process in
Indiana would not seem to be too restrictive. When the 81st Congress was adjourned,
4391 proposals for amendments had been introduced since 1789 with only 21 amendments
being finally ratified. Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
Government Printing Office (1947) ; The Congressional Index, 8oth and 8ist Congresses,
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. (1948 & 1950).
20. Mo. CONST. ART. XII, § 3.
21. Senning, Unicameralism Passes Test, NAT. MUNIC. REv. 58-65 (July, 1944).
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it, since there seems to be little dissatisfaction with these aspects of Indiana's
constitution.
The close of the 1949 legislature provoked considerable criticism and one
legal action when the sixty-one day session stretched to sixty-four calendar
days. The clock, of course, was stopped before midnight of the sixty-first
day, and the journals showed three actual days work to have been accomplished
on the sixty-first day. The legislature is forced to such antics by the consti-
tutional limit set in 1851 on the length of sessions.
About the strongest argument against the sixty-one day session is that
if it were reasonable in 1851 it is, on the face of it, unreasonable now. A
hundred years ago the economy was simple and so was government at all
levels. Our present complex society has brought about a large increase in
governmental services and expenditures; legislative decisions have become
more difficult and more important. To do a roughly adequate job the legisla-
ture needs more time. There seems to be no reason for a limit upon the length
of legislative sessions; there is none in twenty-two states.2 2
A further move to strengthen the legislature in Indiana would be to pro-
vide for annual sessions. As in California, the session in the even-numbered
years could be limited to budget, revenue and tax matters.
One of the immediate improvements that would come from annual ses-
sions is that of budget preparation and appropriation of funds. In this state
the budget presented to the legislature in January or February is prepared
during the fall. The assumptions on which it is erected must be made in the
summer and early fall. In say October of 1950, the Budget Committee must
forecast the revenues and expenditures up to June 30, 1953. If the last twelve
months of this thirty-three month period were lopped off, a more nearly
realistic appraisal of future income and expenses might be made.
Under an annual appropriation system the legislature could more quickly
correct errors. Unforeseen situations often arise and if financial arrangements
must remain static for eighteen or twenty months, the condition can become
damaging and expensive. To a degree such developments can be handled by
contingency funds, but the legislature should, if possible, exercise the policy
determination. Of course, if the length and frequency of legislative sessions
were to be altered by amendment, the pay of legislators -6ould have to be
increased.
Indiana's enumeration and reapportionment problem has become in-
creasingly bitter. Like a disreputable relative, it is disregarded; since 1921,
22. Seventeen states have 60 day sessions and only two states have substantially
shorter sessions than Indiana. In Oregon, only the legislator's pay, a niggardly eight
dollars a day, is legally stopped at the end of fifty days.
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the legislature has neglected to obey the constitutional command to redistrict
the state for legislative seats:
The General Assembly shall, at its second session after the adop-
tion of this constitution, and every sixth year thereafter, cause an
enumeration to be made of all the male inhabitants over the age of
twenty-one years.
The number of Senators and Representatives shall, at the session
next following each period of making such enumeration, be fixed by
law, and apportioned among the several counties, according to the
number of male inhabitants, above twenty-one years of age.2"
No complete enumeration has been made since 1919, although partial
enumerations were reported by the Auditor of State in 1931 and 1937. In
1943 the Marion Circuit Court enjoined the public officers "from taking an
enumeration solely of the male inhabitants" and prohibited the expenditure
of public funds for such a purpose. The likelihood of such enumerations
by township assessors also appears dim.
This provision of the Indiana Constitution is open to serious c iticism.
Why should it be necessary to "cause an enumeration to be made ?" The decen-
nial census of the United States is available, and it could supply all necessary
data. The statistics are as nearly accurate as can be obtained. This body of
official information costs nothing. Moreover, the census is made at the
stipulated time, something that cannot be said of the Indiana enumeration.24
A new apportionment provision certainly should abolish the present re-
quirement that only "male inhabitants of twenty-one years of age" should be
counted for representative purposes. Besides serving no useful purpose, this
provision affronts the women of Indiana. Though the dislocation probably
is not great, the districts with comparatively more women voters are cor-
respondingly under-represented under the present apportionment system.
But the gathering of the necessary population figures, of course, is the
smallest part of the task. Getting the legislature to enact a redistricting act
remains. Redistricting is one of the skeletons in the closet of American
politics, and has been through most of our history.
Before the Indiana problem is considered, it may be worthwhile to note
that the picture is pretty dark elsewhere. At the Conference of Mayors in
1941 it was charged that 60 per cent of the population is urban; that they
23. IND. CONST., ART. IV, §§ 4, 5.
24. In 1861 the idea of using the Federal census as a basis for apportionment was
considered. The Judiciary Committee of the lower house reported that, in its opinion, the
measure was not prohibited by the constitution. The section providing for the taking of
an enumeration was, according to the committee, merely a way for the legislature to
obtain necessary information. ". . . It [making an enumeration] is merely directory
in its character and may be neglected when the information it contemplates can be
obtained in any other legal and reliable way." House Journal 307 (Ind. 1861).
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produce 75 per cent of the national income; that they pay 90 per cent of the
taxes; but that they have only 25 per cent representation in the state legislature.
Some states have their legislative districts fixed, largely, if rot com-
pletely, by their constitution, thus reapportionment can be achieved only by
constitutional amendment. Population is necessarily disregarded as a basis
for representation where such a system is used. In most New England
states, where the town is the unit used for representation, some tremendous
inequalities result. The towns of Colebrook and Hartford each have two
representatives in the House in Connecticut; Colebrook has a population
of 547 and Hartford has 166,000.25
The same result, i.e., gross under-representation, is frequently achieved,
however, by statutory action. The cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco
together have forty-eight per cent of the state's population but have only five
per cent of the representation in the California upper house.2 6 The 1950 cen-
sus will undoubtedly show that the situation has become worse. In Georgia,
Fulton County, with approximately 400,000 population, has three representa-
tives; Echols county with less than 3,000 elects one representative. Dozens
of examples nearly as bad could be cited. Under-representation is typical,
not unusual, in state legislatures.
One of the most effective ways that such under-representation of urban
areas may be effected is by the failure or refusal of the state legislature
to carry out the constitutional mandate. Indiana is in this group of states,,
but it is not a leader.
The population shift to the cities of Indiana leaves the state with some
grossly under-represented areas. But, like a man with a badly sprained ankle
who looks at a person who has lost both legs, Indiana can look at some other
states and say, "I could be a lot worse. 2 7 Still, the sprain can slow progress.
Correcting this violation of the constitution will be difficult. It would
probably be politically inexpedient to include a reapportionment amendment
as part of a modernization of the Indiana Constitution, for to do so would
gravely imperil the whole program. New Jersey's constitutional revision
could be attained only by putting reapportionment outside the scope of change.
Assuming however, that a new reapportionment method is desirable, one
might consider what form it should take. At present, apportionment for both
houses is based theoretically on population (and actually on the geographic
25. In Maryland, a citizen of Baltimore has a vote that is worth only one-seventh as
much as a citizen of Calvert County in the election of a state legislator.
26. Alpine county with a population of 322 elects one senator, thus making a vote
there 351 times as valuable as in Los Angeles county which is also allowed one senator.
27. Reapportionment in the following states is previous to Indiana's: Connecticut-
1870; Mississippi-1892; Kentucky-1893; Tennessee-1905; Illinois-1909; Oregon-
1910; Minnesota-1913. While many others, particularly Florida, Michigan and Kansas,
have reapportioned since Indiana, they are still badly out of date.
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unit determined by the 1921 reapportionment). It could be based on
population, territory, local governing units, singly or in combination.
Much can be said for using population as the basis for apportionment
for both houses. If the utmost in democracy were the goal, multiple-member
districts with proportional representation would be the method of achieving
it. On the other hand, some writers question using a single basis for repre-
sentation in a bicameral legislature:
Bicameralism presupposes that there will be two distinct repre-
sentative bases for its construction and utilization. Indeed it is
almost axiomatic that there must be this duality of base or bi-
cameralism is smitten with the fat of Siamese coupling: the
twins are two, yet one in structure and interconnection.28
Since the simple democratic method established by the 1851 Constitution
is not implemented by Indiana legislatures, it seems that a more nearly
acceptable plan must be advanced. The "federal system," embodied in a
bill introduced by Senator Anness in 1949, has received favor. This bill
would not change the method of apportioning representatives, but the repre-
sentative basis for the Senate would be changed drastically. Under this
plan, counties would be the primary units of representation. The six most
populous counties would be allowed one senator; the other eighty-six counties
would be formed into forty-three two-county senatorial districts.2 1
The Anness plan offers one solution to the urban-rural struggle in both
houses by giving the rural areas complete dominance in the Senate and allow-
ing the urban areas dominance in the House. If the goal is to give the legisla-
tors from the rural areas a check on legislative action that might harm their
constituents, this method should provide it. The lower house, however, would
retain a strong position for bargaining and compromise. Since all units of
government, rural as well as urban, are dependent upon the state for financial
aid, the Senate could not become too arrogant in crushing the legislative
wishes of the lower house.
Yet, even if this plan were adopted, the problem of insuring redistricting
for the lower house as population shifted would remain. In California and
South Dakota if the legislature fails to enact a reapportionment act at the
session required by law, the reapportioning power goes to a board composed
of state officers. The theory back of this arrangement is that the legislature,
knowing that a reapportionment will be carried out even if it evades its duty,
28. Shull, Reapportionment: A Chronic Problem, 30 NAT. MUNIc. REv. 74 (Jan.,
1941).
29. Marion and Lake counties, already under-represented, would lose a number of
senators by the adoption of such a plan; they in turn would gain representatives in the
House. Nothing equivalent to the California situation would result in this state, but a
Marion County vote for senator would have less than one-tenth the weight of a vote
in the Park-Clay senatorial district.
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will redistrict the state. Failure of the secondary apportionment group to
act can be overcome by mandamus.
In South Dakota in 1947 the legislature passed an apportionment act,
but failed to redistrict. The previous apportionment was reenacted. In
Indiana such a tactic could be met by an appeal to the courts. In Parker v.
State ex rel. Powell30 the supreme court held that reapportionment is judicial
and not political. The court stated that apportionment acts to be constitutional
must be equitable. In any event, a constitutional provision might well sub-
ject the redistricting and reapportioning to judicial review.
THE EXECUTIVE
Reorganization of the executive branch of both the national and state
governments has been of persistent interest in this country. The cost of
government has skyrocketed: in 1913 the disbursements of the state of
Indiana totaled $9,100,000; by 1947 the figure had risen to $259,000,000. 81
The tremendous expansion of governmental services, with an attendant
increase in taxes, forced people, in and out of government, to try to in-
crease the efficiency and economy of administrative operations.
The reform movement of the first decade brought into being the Taft
Commission on Economy and -Efficiency to improve operation of the federal
government. In Indiana the Marshall amendments failed. The only positive
gain of the period was the Public Depository Law3 2 and the law establishing the
State Board of Accounts.33 After the creation of both federal and state budget-
ing agencies in 1921, the drive for improvement of the executive branch
waned."'
The depression of the thirties', with the consequent expansion of govern-
mental activities and expenditures, reawakened interest in executive reform.
A fairly elaborate reorganization of the state administrative machinery was
achieved in 1933. 3, (Incidentally, Indiana had not been a leader in the
reorganization movement. Sixteen other states had acted before 1933.)
The reorganization act provided for eight departments (another was
added in 1935). Though students of public administration approved the inte-
gration that the departmentalization had brought, the reorganization caused
much controversy. Officers in the administration stated that only a paper
departmentalization had resulted, leaving the former independent agencies to
operate as in the past. Others charged the Governor with becoming a czar.
30. 133 Ind. 178, 33 N.E. 119 (1893).
31. State Board of Accounts, Statistical Report, State of Indiana 17 (1948).
32. IND. AcTs, 1907, c. 222, pp. 391-404. This act has since been repealed and some of
its provisions embodied in new legislation.
33. IND. STAT. ANN. 60-210, 60-251 (Burns Repl. 1943).
34. IN. STAT. ANN. 60-412, 60-421 (Bums Repl. 1943).
35. IND. Acts, 1933 c. 4 §§ 1-32.
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Following reorganization, the Governor appointed a committee to study
the operation of the executive-administrative branch. This committee, headed
by Dean Gavit, made some excellent recommendations. In the main, they
were never enacted by the General Assembly.
In 1940 the Republicans gained control of both houses of the legislature
and won every state office except that of governor. The 1933-35 reorganiza-
tion acts were repealed,"6 and a new executive organization was created.3 7 The
new law provided that the appointing power be shared with the Lieutenant
Governor. For ordinary administrative functions, a "board of department"
was given directive powers; each board was composed of the Governor and
two officers of the opposing political party. When his veto of these acts
was overridden, Governor Schricker caused the Attorney General to initiate
a suit to test their constitutionality. The supreme court held them un-
constitutional because they conferred part of the Governor's appointing
power on administrative officers; such power was vested 'in the Governor
exclusively.38 This decision returned the administrative machinery of the
state to its condition prior to the 1933 reorganization. With the exception
of the Financial Reorganization Act of 1947,"" that is where it remains.
Meanwhile on the national level a renewed interest in executive re-
organization developed." The publication of the Hoover Commission's
twenty-three Task Force Reports and eighteen Reports to the Congress revived
the drive for state reorganization. Twenty-three states and two territories
established commissions to study the executive branch of their state govern-
ments. Indiana alone of the North Central states took'no action. Such Hoosier
complacency is not based upon existing superiority of executive organization.
Any group charged with recommending organizational improvements
must first determine what changes should be made in the constitution and
what should be left to statutory action. In Indiana at present several ad-
ministrative officers are elected. The constitution provides:
36. IND. AcTs, 1940 c. 4, p. 809; c. 13, p. 132; c. 40, p. 124.
37. Id. at c. 13, pp. 31-48.
38. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941).
39. The following excerpts reveal the belief that administrative reorganization was
needed. "Whereas, during the past thirty years, the functions of the administrative
branch of state government have multiplied many times, and . . . Whereas, the Legisla-
ture by its enactment of laws which authorized these many additional functions did pro-
vide for the administration and management of each of them, they did not, however,
provide a uniform plan but provided many different plans of procedure which have made
the administration and management of the fiscal affairs of the state government very
difficult for the executive and administrative branches of the government of the
State. . . ." IND. AcTs, 1947, c. 279, pp. 138-39.
40. A commission to study the executive branch of the federal government was
created by 5 U.S.C.A. § 133 (1947).
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There shall be elected, by the voters of the State, a Secretary, and
Auditor and a Treasurer of the State, who shall, severally, hold their
offices for two years. They shall perform such duties as may be
enjoined by law; and no person shall be eligible to either of said
offices more than four years in any period of six years.4 '
In addition, the Superintendent of Public Instruction is a constitutional
officer;2 the Attorney General is a popularly elected statutory officer.43
These officers are responsible to the voters, not to the Governor. Yet
administrative theory leans heavily on the idea of granting the Governor
authority commensurate with his responsibility. The first report of the
Hoover Commission states:
Responsibility and accountability are impossible without authority
-the power to direct. The exercise of authority is impossible with-
out a clear line of command from top to bottom, and a return line
of responsibility and accountability from bottom to top. 44
The committee headed by Dean Gavit in 1935 expressed the same attitude.
43
This also is the position of the Model Constitution, 46 prepared by the
National Muncipal League, and the 1947 Constitution of New Jersey.
4 7
41. INn. CONsr. ART. VI, § 1.
42. IND. CoNsT. ART. VIII, § 8.
43. IND. STAT. ANN. 49-1920 (Burns Supp. 1949).
44. THE COMflSSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXEcUTIVE BRANCH OF GoVEN-
MENT, GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANcH 1 (1948).
45. "In order that officials may do things they must be given power. Power may be
abused. To prevent the abuse which might come from unrestricted one-man power,
control must be set up. Formerly two devices were used to control the use of power:
1. Power was scattered among several people.
2. A system of checks and balances was set up. The result was a sacrifice of
strength, vigor, and promptness. Also responsibility for wrong doing or not
doing could not be fixed, i.e., it permitted buck passing. A system of checks
intended to check bad acts will also check good ones just as quickly with the
result of loss of efficiency.
"More recently it has been found that the best way to get satisfactory results
promptly is:
1. To confer ample power on some single person with sufficient subordinate
assistance.
2. To hold that person directly responsible for getting results.
"The substitute for the old devices for controlling the use of power is to fix direct
responsibility for every act on some one person. Persons are held to their responsibility
through the possibility of removal and through budgetary control."
REPORT OF THE INDIANA STATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ECONOiY 42 (1935).
46. MODEL STATE CONST. ART. V, § 503 (4th ed. 1941).
47. "Each principal department shall be under the supervision of the Governor. The
head of each principal department shall be a single executive unless otherwise provided
by law. Such single executives shall be nominated and appointed by the Governor, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at the pleasure of the Governor during his
term of office and until the appointment and qualification of their successors, except as
herein otherwise provided with respect to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.
The Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall be nominated and appointed
by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve during the term of
office of the Governor." N.J. CONST. ART. V, § 4.
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Power of appointment of top administrators should be given by consti-
tutional grant." An Auditor of State, elected. to a four-year term, seems
to the present writers a sufficient check on the Governor.
A grant of authority without the means to apply it is, at best, only an
empty gesture. Two plans have ordinarily been used in state reorganizations
of the executive branch to implement the authority granted to the Governor.
These changes should be statutory, not constitutional. The first plan pro-
vides for a departmentalization of the administration. Indiana at present
has 105 departments, bureaus, boards, commissions, and offices, not counting
the educational, penal and benevolent institutions.49 A departmentalized sys-
tem, enacted by legislation, would draw these agencies together, primarily on
the basis of function, into from eight to twenty-two departments. An adminis-
trator responsible to the Governor would head each. The department under the
Auditor of course would not be subject to the same control as the dthers.
There is no acceptable formula available to determine how many depart-
ments should be created. Considerable variation exists in the proposals made
by the various groups who have studied reorganization recently.5" The Arizona
group recommended eight; Connecticut and New Jersey, fourteen; Ohio,
fifteen; Oklahoma, nine; Virginia, eleven. 1 If the number is too large,
the Governor will not be able to keep abreast of program developments
and problems. If the number is too small, as was probably so in the Indiana
reorganization of 1941, the tasks undertaken by the sub-units of the de-
partment are so diverse that the department head will be incapable of pro-
viding the proper administrative leadership and direction.
The second plan used to give the Governor administrative authority is to
provide him with sufficient staff assistance. He should be provided with at
least an advisory aide and a personal secretary. The housekeeping functions of
state government should be under the immediate control of the Governor." So
that he can better exercise control, several bureaus within the office of the
48. The recommendation of making the Secretary of State, Treasurer, Attorney
General and Superintendent of Public Instruction app6intive rather than elective has
been made in Connecticut, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota (excepting the Attorney General),
Nevada and Idaho. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, REORGANIZING STATE GOVERNMENT
107-110 (1950).
49. Roster of State and Local Officials, State of Indiana 3-20 (1949).
50. "All executive and administrative offices, departments, and instrumentalities of
the State Government . . . shall be allocated by law among and within not more than
twenty principal departments . . ." N.J. CONST. ART. V, § 4. New York's constitution
likewise sets twenty as the maximum number allowable.
51. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, REORGANIZING STATE GOV ERNMENT 96-103
(1950).
52. In some states the housekeeping functions have been drawn together into a De-
partment of Administration under the Governor. In Minnesota this development has
been reported on very favorably. Henderson, How a State Can Be Managed, 35 NAT.
MUNic. REV. 524 (Nov., 1946). New Hampshire, Washington, and Ohio groups have
recommended that such a plan be adopted in their states.
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Governor should be created by legislative action. These should include Bureaus
of the Budget,13 Procurement, 4 Reporting and Information," and Planning.
Personnel administration in Indiana also needs overhauling. Sound pro-
grams of recruitment and examination, classification, efficiency rating, com-
pensation, and retirement are highly desirable for purposes of morale and
efficient operation. Though Indiana's merit system has existed for nearly
ten years, the merit idea has been accepted somewhat gingerly. Large areas
of administration including the staff of the Auditor of State, the Department
of Revenue, the Department of Conservation, and the State Highway Commis-
sion are operated on an out-and-out spoils system. Though the bi-partisan
merit system of the State Board of Accounts and the State Police seems to
work satisfactorily, the necessary political adjustment works an undesirable
complication in administration. A non-political merit provision in the Consti-
tution would put efficient public service above political reward. The New
York provision might well serve as a model: "Appointments and promotions
in the civil service of the state and all of the civil divisions thereof .. .shall be
made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable,
by examination, which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive. . . . 6
Since liaison between the Department of Law and the Office of the
Governor should be closely maintained, a legal assistant should be perma-
nently assigned to the Governor.
In reorganizing the executive branch of government, Indiana might well
revise the veto powers.17 The increasing complexity of legislation requires
the Governor to make a thorough study of a bill before he takes action. The
three days allowed to study bills submitted while the legislature is in session
should be increased to seven or ten. The five days to act on bills after the legis-
lature has adjourned seems even less adequate. The New York Constitution
allows the Governor thirty days; the New Jersey Constitution permits forty-
five. Also, the simple majority now required to override a veto could well
be increased to two thirds.
The recommendations made here express orthodox principles and theories
in public administration. Orthodoxy, however, should not be taken to imply
53. The abolition of our present legislative-executive system of budgeting is indicated
by this recommendation. Such a change would be in keeping with orthodox budgeting
theory. It would be quite possible, however, to retain our present system if that were
desired.
54. This staff agency would make purchases for all the departments, would maintain
all state-owned or rented space, would supervise all state construction.
55. This bureau would digest the various reports submitted to the Governor's office
and keep the Governor and the public currently informed on the condition of the state's
business.
56. N.Y. CoNsT. ART. V, § 6.
57. IND. CoNsT. ART. V, § 14.
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unanimity. Strong and vigorous dissent has been expressed on some of these
ideas.58
JUDICIAL REFORM
Improvement of the judicial branch of state government has been much
discussed by the legal profession."' If salary considerations are set aside as a
matter to be determined by statute, the basic problems are the method of selec-
tion of judges and term to be allotted to the office. The arguments for and
against election or appointment are too well known to be warmed over here.
The Model State Constitution idea, adopted by Missouri in its 1945 constitu-
tion, combines the two methods. Selection is made by the executive from one
of three names submitted to him by a non-partisan judicial commission. After
a probationary period of twelve months in Missouri, two years in California,
and four years under the Model Constitution, the judge runs unopposed on
his record. A majority popular vote, registered on a separate ballot with no
party label, determines if the judge retains his place on the bench. The idea
behind the system is that better judges can be selected initially and can be
retained longer. In the vast majority of such elections in Missouri the
judges have retained their seats. Only vigorous opposition from bar as-
sociations has been able to unseat judges who were unsatisfactory.
The term of office for judges varies among the states from two years to
life. The six-year term of Indiana is shared by sixteen other states ; thirty allow
seven or more years, half of them providing terms of ten or more."' Indiana
tenure should be lengthened. Also the constitutional limitation of four years
for legislatively created judicial offices61 might well be abolished.
Article 7, Section 14, which provides for a competent number of Justices
of the Peace to be popularly elected in each township could also be dropped. A
system of magistrate's courts might be established by statute, or the Justices
of the Peace could be retained where necessary under statutory enactment.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
In Indiana local governmental units are creatures of the state legislature.
The constitution has relatively little to say concerning how local government
shall be organized, what functions shall be performed locally, or what powers
58. See WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 130-191 (1948); Hyneman, Adininistra-
tive Reorganization: An Adventure into Science and Theology, JOURNAL OF POLITIcs 62
(February, 1939) ; Finer, The Hoover Commission Reports, 64 POL. ScI. Q. 405-419, 579-
595 (Sept., Dec., 1949).
59. See e.g., Bomberger, Book Review, 26 IND. L.J. 124 (1950).
60. California, 12; Colorado, 10; Delaware, 12; Louisiana, 14; Maryland, 15; Massa-
chussetts, life; Missouri, 12; New York, 14; North Dakota, 10; Pennsylvania, 21; Rhode
Island, life; South Carolina, 10; Utah, 10; Virginia, 12; West Virginia, 12; Wisconsin, 10.
61. "But the General Assembly shall not create any office, the tenure of which shall
be longer than four (4) years. . . ." IND. CoNsT. ART. 15, § 2.
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shall be exercised. Article 4, Section 22, prohibits passage of special laws on
county and township government and fees and salaries, and Article 15 prohibits
the reduction of counties to an area of less than 400 quare miles. Article 6 pro-
vides for the election and term of office of certain county officers, and all local
corporations are subject to the two per cent debt limitation. But township, city,
and town governmental organization is provided for mostly by implication.
The paucity of constitutional provisions concerning local government
might be deemed a blessing in as much as more flexibility in creation and
organization is theoretically possible. But most critics now condemn the lack
of suitable constitutional provisions concerning the structure, organization,
and powers of local units. More specifically, most advocates of better
local government recommend that home rule or optional charters be provided
for in a constitution. Our hydra-headed county government and inefficiently
organized city government might still persist, but, if given a choice, un-
doubtedly many counties and cities would take advantage of the opportunity
to improve by selecting the kind of governmental machinery fit to do the
job. At least that has been the story in most other home rule states.
The term "home rule" has been considerably abused and misused. To
some local officials, it seems to mean a guarantee of all the rights and
privileges of local government, particularly the "right" of more state fi-
nancial aid, with none of the obligations of local government. The Ameri-
can Municipal Association has defined the term as follows:
Broadly speaking, municipal home rule is the power of local self-
government, whether such power is conferred by constitutional or
statutory grant, or by the electorate of a community through the adop-
tion of a charter authorized by state organic law. Since statutory
home rule can be rescinded by the state legislature, real home rule is
usually considered as emanating only from a state constitution. Home
rule includes the power of a municipality to determine the form of
its government by adoption of a charter, to define the nature and
scope of municipal services, and to conduct all local activity by
officers selected by it, acting in its own right with respect to the
enforcement of municipal ordinances and as an agent of the state
in the enforcement of state laws and concerns.
6 -2
Since 1875, when Missouri adopted constitutional home rule, nineteen
states have chosen this method of changing the pattern of state-local relations
from one of complete subservience to one of partial independence. In three
of the constitutional home rule states, the legislature has never placed the
principle into operation or has limited it to one city. In others, notably
Minnesota, Ohio, and Texas, as-much as ninety per cent of the urban popu-
lation govern themselves under home rule.63
62. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' AssocIATION, MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 92 (1945).
63. MoTr, HomE RULE FOR AMERICA'S CITIES 62 (1949).
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Another type of local government which gives a choice of charters is the
optional law system now permitted by a number of states. Under this sys-
tem, the legislature authorizes several alternative plans of government, such
as mayor-council, council-manager, or commission form, from which cities
and towns may choose. Still another plan varies the governmental forms
for different classes of cities.64
The history of municipal home rule shows that the principle is a sound one.
Home rule, and to a lesser extent the optional charter system, relieves the legis-
lature of much detailed and burdensome work. Since 1929, from 28 to 39 per
cent of the acts of the" General Assembly have dealt with local governmental
units and affairs. A much larger number of bills on local affairs are introduced
each session; many are arbitrary or whimsical. Home rule gives a much greater
flexibility to the administration of local government by providing municipalities
a means of selecting the best tools to fit particular needs. And the practice of
responsible self-government within the local communities certainly strengthens
democracy.
Home rule, however, has neither proved an unmitigated blessing nor a
panacea for all municipal ills. Two major problems have accompanied it.
The first problem has been framing the constitutional amendment to grant
the substance of home rule as well as the form. The grant of charter-
making power in which citizens may choose their form of government but
have little discretion on what services may be undertaken or how such
services shall operate is only the shadow of self-government.
To give a broad grant of self-government as in Ohio, where municipalities
"have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to
adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws," has resulted
in the necessity of much judicial interpretation." The decisions have, in
general, tended to restrict the powers of home rule units.
But to enumerate specifically the powers of home rule or to attempt to
define too closely what shall be subject to municipal control presents the
second danger: inflexibility. What is strictly a municipal matter today
may become a matter of statewide concern tomorrow. As examples, the
fields of finance, sewage disposal and public utilities were at one time subject
only to local control but today are generally subject to state regulation.6
64. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASSOCIATION, MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 528
(1950).
65. See McGOLDRIcK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1933) ; Schoup,
Constitutional Problems of County Home Rule in Ohio, WESTERN L. REV. (Dec. 1949).
The home rule amendment contained in the Model State Constitution attempts to
effect a compromise by giving both broad general powers and nine classes of more specific
powers. Art. VIII, § 804.
66. McGOLDRICK, op. cit. supra note 65 at 342.
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There have been several attempts in the past to give Indiana local units a
measure of self-government. The 1921 session of the General Assembly en-
acted an optional charter law giving cities a choice between council-manager and
commission forms of government. Michigan City subsequently adopted a
council-manager charter, but when Indianapolis chose to do so, the action
was challenged. The Indiana Supreme Court held the act invalid on the
ground that it was physically impossible for the clerk to check 19,000 signa-
tures, twenty per cent of the voters in the last election, within a period of five
days as required by the statute. Since the act could not apply to the city
of Indianapolis, it was no longer a general law and therefore violated the
prohibition against special legislation. 67  The decision has effectively pre-
vented the passage of new optional charter laws.
Stymied on an optional charter system, a Governor's City Manager
Study Commission recommended a self-executing home rule amendment
to the 1941 General Assembly. The amendment passed the 1941 session
but died during the 1943 Assembly. It was again submitted in 1949 but
was not widely championed; it again failed.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
The Indiana Constitution forbids state indebtedness except for war,
disaster, or to meet casual deficits, but certain state agencies are not bound
by its provisions. Municipal corporations may not contract indebtedness
to exceed two per cent of the assessed valuation.
The two per cent clause has been aptly called a "rubber yardstick." Two
methods of evasion have been generally used in Indiana as well as in other
states with constitutional or statutory limits on indebtedness. The first is to
decrease or increase the assessed valuation in order to decrease or increase the
bonding limit. Since the 1949 reassessment on a 33 1/3 per cent basis has
reduced the assessed valuation in some counties, it can be readily understood
why many local units, especially school townships, find it so difficult to finance
much needed expansion. A low valuation, together with a statutory limitation
on the tax rate, may please overly tax-conscious citizens but it seems a
short-sighted policy.
The second method of evasion has been the creation of new and over-
lapping governmental units. The 1939 Indiana Tax Study Commission re-
ported that there were 633 out of 1636 units of government over the two per
cent limit of direct indebtedness because of the overlapping debt burden.6
67. Keane v. Remy, 201 Ind. 286, 168 N.E. 10 (1922).
68. Nine cities and fourteen towns had indebtedness of more than ten per cent. RE-
PORT OF THE INDIANA TAX STUDY ComaissIoN 37 (1939).
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. The technique of forming special units of government as a means of
increasing the debt margin may no longer be successful, however. The
Indiana Supreme Court in the Rappaport case seems to have outlawed the
special district as a "borrowing machine," 69 but the scope of the decision
remains yet undetermined. Even if this is the effect of the case, an attempt
to remove the debt limit in a new constitution or by amendment would prob-
ably provoke much objection.
Many authorities now favor administrative control of local indebtedness
rather than reliance upon a flat limitation by either statute or constitution.
The North Carolina Local Government Commission, for example, seems to
have worked quite well in keeping local indebtedness within bounds in that
state.70  The Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners exercises a similar
function through its petition and review procedure.
Another financial provision of the Indiana Constitution which has tended
to place a handicap on financial administration is Article 10, Section 1, which
requires that taxes be levied on a uniform basis. All classes of property,
both tangible and intangible, must be taxed at the same rate. The provision
has produced widespread evasions and inequities when enforced.
Several state constitutions permit direct popular legislation in one form or
another, but there seems little prospect that the initiative movement would be
considered in Indiana or other states not now permitting direct democracy.71
Also, there seems little agitation for change in Indiana's Bill of Rights. It
is interesting to note however that the Bill of Rights of the New Jersey Consti-
tution of 1947 was extended to guarantee collective bargaining, absentee voting
by servicemen and non-discrimination on the basis of race, color, or sex.
CONVENTION, COMMISSION, OR COMMITTEE
An effort to revise the Indiana Constitution would necessarily be prefaced
by consideration of the method to be used. Of course, the convention has
been the traditional method of constitution making. The constitution ratified
by New Jersey in 1947 was drafted by an elected convention. The'commission
form of revision was used as early as 1852; one is making a study of the
Minnesota constitution at the present time. In California, a joint legislative
committee was authorized to draft a revised constitution in 1947. Still another
69. Rappaport v. Dept. of Public Health and Hospitals, 227 Ind. 508, 87 N.E.2d 77
(1949). But see Dept. of Public Sanitation of City of Hammond v. Solan, 97 N.E.2d
495 (Ind. 1951).
70. KILPATRICK, STATE SUPERVISION OF LOCAL FINANCE (1941) ; Fesler, North Caro-
lina's Local Governnment Cominission, 30 NAT. MUNIC. REV. 327-334 (June, 1941).
71. Crouch, The Initiative and Referendum in Cities, 37 Am. PoL. Scl. REV. 500-501
(June, 1943).
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variation is being tried in Louisiana where the -Louisiana State University
Law Institute has been commissioned to draft a new bagic law. 2
Each method of constitutional study and revision has certain advantages
and disadvantages. The fact that a more select group of delegatds are chosen
for convention than are elected to a legislature favors the convention method.
A convention also allows concentration of both the members and the public up-
on a specific purpose rather than the division of interest that would accompany
the legislature acting as a convention. Some disadvantages of a convention are
the expense (New York's 1938 convention cost $1,300,000 for four months'
work) and the formal procedures are not well adapted to constitution making.
Since the legislature is already organized, it is claimed that a legislature
acting as a convention will save money. Since the legislative process is used
anyway, proponents of this method insist that the initial draft might well be
done by the legislature. The disadvantages of legislative drafting are that
not enough time can be devoted to constitutional framing nor can enough
public and legislative interest be concentrated on the task.
The commission or legislative interim committee method has found
more favor recently on the ground that such methods are efficient because
the group is small and better able to discuss technical problems, and that more
able men will accept appointment than will seek election. The commission
is also supposed to be more independent of pressure groups and less ex-
pensive. The commission, however, is supposedly less representative of the
public and legislative approval of its work may be hard to obtain.7
3
Whatever method of constitutional revision is used, the first and foremost
requirement is an awakened and educated public before, during, and after the
revision is undertaken. Interest in constitutional revision in Indiana ii not in-
tense at the present. But as the authors have attempted to point out in this
brief survey, several serious constitutional problems do exist. These problems
promise to become more critical in the future and it seems particularly appro-
priate that during this Centennial year a thorough study be made. Such a
study might well be part of the task of a "little Hoover Commission."
While change for its own sake is not desirable, neither should we allow
our constitution to become encrusted with age merely because of ancestor
worship. As Thomas Jeffers6n is oft-quoted:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence,
and deem them like the ark of the covenant-too sacred to be
touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more
72. Much of the above is taken from CouNciL OF STATE: GOVERNMENTS, Boor OF
STATES 81-98 (1950).
73. See Keith, Methods of Constitutional Revision, BUREAU OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH;
DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910); Rich, Conven-
tion or Commission, 37 NAT. MUNIC. Rxv. 133-136 (March, 1948).
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than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment
. . . [but] o . . laws and institutions must go hand in hand with
the progress of the human mind . . . and keep pace with the times.
